Abstract-One of the important challenges in statistical privacy is the design of algorithms that maximize a utility measure subject to restrictions imposed by privacy considerations. In this paper we examine large classes of privacy definitions and utility measures. We identify their geometric characteristics and some common properties of optimal privacy-preserving algorithms.
INTRODUCTION
Improvements in data collection technology have been accompanied by demonstrations of the importance of data-driven approaches to making business, policy, and social decisions. The need to use and share large data sets has also raised privacy concerns. Statistical privacy is a multi-disciplinary field that studies how to reveal useful information contained in these data sets while preventing inference about sensitive information (such as the record of a specific individual or a business secret).
As the study of "information" progresses, evolving ideas about privacy lead to new privacy definitions (i.e., restrictions on the behavior of data-processing algorithms to guarantee limits on adversarial inference) and new ways of measuring the quality of the outputs of privacy-preserving algorithms (i.e. utility).
As a consequence, the central optimization problem -designing algorithms that maximize utility subject to privacy constraints -keeps changing. Because of this changing landscape, it is important to identify optimization principles that remain invariant as privacy definitions and utility metrics change.
Even basic properties of optimal solutions can differ. For example, under some combinations of privacy definition/utility measure, if one is interested in a query answer then optimal privacy preserving algorithms should have as many possible output values as there are query answers. For other privacy definition/utility measure combinations, the optimal privacy-preserving algorithm must have strictly more possible outputs (contrary to a common intuition that the outputs should be in one-to-one correspondence with query answers).
Recent research about desirable properties of privacy definitions and utility measures has identified generic mathematical classes they can belong to. In this paper we discuss the geometry of these classes of privacy definitions and utility measures, and identify geometric properties possessed by the corresponding optimal privacy-preserving algorithms.
The goal of this paper is to present a new perspective on the central optimization problem in statistical privacy. We hope its main role is that of raising (rather than answering) additional interesting questions.
In Section 2, we introduce terminology and notation, including a convenient matrix view of randomized algorithms. In Section 3, we discuss conic privacy definitions -a large class of privacy definitions that subsumes many, but not all existing definitions. In Section 4, we show that for reasonable informationpreserving utility measures, one can always find an optimal conic privacy-preserving algorithm with linearly independent conditional probability vectors (in particular, this implies the existence of optimal algorithms whose range and domain have the same size); this is not necessarily true for non-conic privacy definitions. In Section 5 we discuss geometric interpretations of a class of utility measures called branching measures and in Section 6 we discuss interactions between the geometries of privacy and utility. A sanitizing algorithm M is a deterministic or randomized algorithm whose domain is I and whose range is countable.
NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY

Let
For convenience, we represent a sanitizing algorithm M as a matrix where the columns are indexed by I, rows are indexed by the countable set range(M), and whose entries are P (M(D) = ω):
We use the notation P (M(·) = ω) to refer to the vector
. . , which is the row of the matrix form of M that is indexed by ω.
We define the following operators:
is the algorithm that runs M 1 with probability p and M 2 with probability 1 − p and reveals which algorithm was run.
is the algorithm that runs M 1 with probability p and M 2 with probability 1 − p.
A privacy definition Priv is a set of sanitizing algorithms with input domain I. Intuitively, it is the set of algorithms trusted to process the sensitive input data without leaking too much sensitive information.
A utility measure µ I is a function that assigns a real number to sanitizing algorithms whose input domain is I.
The sanitizing mechanism design problem is to (possibly approximately) solve the following optimization problem: argmax
CONIC PRIVACY DEFINITIONS
In this paper, we are investigating the sanitizing mechanism design problem over conic privacy definitions. This is a class of privacy definitions that includes differential privacy [1] , pufferfish [2] , and essentially all privacy definitions Priv that satisfy several common-sense properties [3] and always (not just with high probability) bound information leakage to an attacker [3] .
Definition 3.1 (Privacy Cone
is a privacy cone if it contains the vector 1 and is closed under vector addition and multiplication by scalars ≥ 0.
Definition 3.2 (Conic Privacy Definition).
A privacy definition Priv is conic if there exists a privacy cone C such that M ∈ Priv if and only if every row of the matrix form of M belongs to C (i.e. P (M(·) = ω) ∈ C for all ω ∈ range(M)) An example is differential privacy. [1] ). M belongs to the set of -differentially private algorithms if for every ω ∈ range(M) and pair of datasets D, D that differ on the value of one record,
Definition 3.3 (Differential Privacy
However, the following variant is not conic. 
UTILITY AND LINEAR INDEPENDENCE
In this section we study properties of solutions to the sanitizing mechanism design equation M * = argmax M∈Priv µ I (M) when Priv is a conic privacy definition.
When I is finite, we show that for a large class of utility measures, we can restrict our attention to algorithms M * whose matrix form consists of linearly independent rows (hence, range(M * ) ≤ | I |). We then show that this is not necessarily the case for non-conic privacy definitions (e.g., ( , δ)-differential privacy).
We consider utility measures that satisfy the axioms of sufficiency, continuity, and quasi-convexity, which are defined as follows.
The intuition behind sufficiency is that M 1 can be used to simulate M 2 (with the help of a postprocessing algorithm A). If M 2 is useful for some task, then M 1 can be used instead. 
Continuity states that small changes to the probabilistic behavior of an algorithm results in small changes to its utility.
Axiom 4.3. (Quasi-convexity [6]). µ
The intuition behind quasi-convexity is that if we prefer M 2 over M 1 , then we should also prefer M 2 over M ≡ M 1 ⊕ p M 2 , since M sometimes behaves like M 2 but otherwise behaves like the less preferred algorithm M 1 .
We now arrive at the main result of this section. Proof: This proof is divided into three steps.
Step 1: We first show that if a sanitizing algorithm M has finite range then there exists a M ∈ Priv whose matrix representation consists of linearly independent rows and µ I (M ) ≥ µ I (M).
Without loss of generality, we may assume the matrix form of M has no rows that are constant multiples of each other (if it does, we can merge those rows and the algorithm M † that corresponds to the resulting matrix form has
. If the matrix form of M has full row rank then we are done (i.e. M = M). Thus we need to consider M with linearly dependent rows. Let r 1 , . . . , r m be the rows of the matrix form of M. Without loss of generality, assume the linear dependency is among the first n + 1 rows (re-ordering rows as necessary):
where (1) the c i are all non-negative, (2) 
(since the r i have no negative components and all the c i are non-negative, clearly there are non-zero terms on both sides of the equation, so we can rescale it so that c L = 1). We construct algorithms A and B such that M = pA + (1 − p)B for some p ∈ [0, 1]. Define B) ≤ max {µ I (A), µ I (B)}. Since the range of M is finite, we repeatedly apply this procedure to either A or B until we obtain a matrix M with independent rows such that µ I (M ) ≥ µ I (M).
Step 2: If the range of M is countably infinite, we use Axiom 4.2 and to obtain a M (j) with finite range and
We then use Step 1 to obtain M (j †) whose range is at most | I | (because its rows are linearly independent) and µ I (M (j †) ) ≥ µ I (M (j) ). Standard compactness arguments now imply some subsequence of the M (j †) converge to a M with at most | I | rows and µ I (M ) ≥ µ I (M). Since conic privacy definitions use closed cones, M ∈ Priv (also, by step 1, we can then get linearly independent rows).
Step 3: Let M 1 , M 2 , . . . be a sequence of algorithms with linearly independent rows such that µ I (M 1 ) ≤ µ I (M 2 ) ≤ . . . . Standard compactness arguments and continuity of µ I imply that a subsequence converges to a M ∈ Priv with at most | I | rows. Combined with steps 1 and 2, this fact implies the existence of an optimal M * ∈ Priv having linearly independent rows. Now let us consider a non-conic privacy definition such as ( , δ)-differential privacy (where = 0). Let I = {0, 1} and consider the utility function µ I L2 (M) =
It is continuous and satisfies Axiom 4.3 because the L 2 norm is convex. As we will see in Section 5, it also satisfies Axiom 4.1. It is straightforward to show that for every algorithm M whose matrix form has linearly independent rows (and hence | range(M)| ≤ 2), there exists another M with 3 or more possible outputs and strictly higher utility. 1 Aside from having linearly independent rows, we can also ensure that the rows of an optimal algorithm are points on the boundary of the privacy cone (i.e. the least private among the acceptable choices of P (M(·) = ω)) rather than, say, points in the interior of the privacy cone yet at the boundary of the unit hypercube caused by the constraint P (M(D i ) = ω) ≤ 1. Proof: Let M * be an algorithm with rows in C that maximizes µ I . For each ω ∈ range(M * ), the vector P (M * (·) = ω) belongs to some finite portion of C (i.e. a subset of C containing all vectors with L ∞ norm less than some constant κ ω . Thus, by Carathéodory's Theorem, P (M * (·) = ω) can be written as a convex combination c 1 x 1 + · · · + c r x r of r ≤ | I | + 1 vectors from the boundary of C. We can modify M * so that instead of outputting ω (with probability vector
with probability vectors P (M * (·) = ω (i) ) = c i x i . Performing this modification for all ω ∈ range(M * ) for which P (M * (·) = ω) is in the interior of C results in an algorithm M † whose rows all belong to the boundary of C and clearly there exists an A such that M * = A • M † so that µ I (M † ) ≥ µ I (M * ). Now we apply Theorem 4.4 to obtain from M † a new algorithm M whose rows are linearly independent vectors. These vectors also belong to the boundary of C because they are formed by taking scalar multiples and limits of subsequences of rows of M † .
GEOMETRIC VIEW OF UTILITY
In this section we provide a geometric view of a large class of utility measures. We consider utility measures that satisfy Axioms 4.1, 4.2, and the following branching axiom (it turns out that quasi-convexity is a consequence of these three axioms).
Axiom 5.1. (Branching [5] ). An information preservation measure µ I should satisfy the relation
1. The main idea is that if = 0 and M has two possible outputs then there exists some output ω ∈ range(M) such that 0 < P (M(2) = ω) ≤ P (M(1) = ω) and P (M(1) = ω) ≤ e P (M(2) = ω) + δ. This vector z ≡ P (M(·) = ω) can then be broken into two vectors x and y, with x + y = z such that replacing z in the matrix representation of an algorithm with x and y will result in a new algorithm that still satisfies the privacy constraints but has strictly higher utility.
for some function H, where
